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Abstract: This paper argues for a novel way of addressing questions about the relationship between politics and science: in terms of norms of communication, rather than norms of
cognition. The first half of the paper motivates this general shift through close study of
the concept of "wishful speaking"; arguing that this vice - rather than the more familiar
"wishful thinking" - better captures real-life cases, such as the Lysenko affair. The second half builds on the ethics of communication to develop an account of the proper role of non-epistemic values in justification in terms of "value-aptness".

In 1948, Izaak Prezent claimed that “nobody forbids and nobody can forbid discussion in science.” This may seem rather a banal statement of a liberal piety. However, Prezent continued, “let us accordingly discuss within the framework of the Michurinite tendency the best way of studying this doctrine and applying it in practice. But it is high time to demand from you your participation in the struggle against foreign biologists” (Huxley, 1949, 939). Prezent was speaking at the meeting of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences which resulted in Michurinism – an account of epigenetic inheritance commonly known as Lysenkoism – being adopted as the “only correct theory” henceforth to be taught in the USSR. The key moment came in Trofim Lysenko’s address on the conference’s final day. After presenting his report on problems with Mendelian genetics, which proposed changes to scientific training and research organisation, he added: “the Central Committee of the Party has examined my report and approved it” (Krementsov, 1996, 172). Scientists were being told that they should adopt Lysenkoism as part of the Stalinist doctrine of partiinost’, according to which intellectuals should adhere to the Party line and subordinate their activities to Party objectives (Krementsov, 1996, 296). 

This paper is structured around three questions raised by the Lysenko affair. It is a commonplace that the affair exemplifies a problematic relationship between political institutions and scientific research (Demeter, 2015; Lewens, 2015). Hence, my first question: what is the proper relationship between political institutions and scientific research? Sometimes, the affair is cited in a second context, of debates over the “value free ideal” for science, i.e. the claim that “the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. political or moral) grounds” (Betz, 2013, 207). Hence, my second question: what is the proper role, if any, of non-epistemic values in scientific justification? Plausibly, these two questions are related. However, this terrain is complex, because even if justificatory practices must be “value-laden”, “good” science can be pursued in, and motivated by “bad” political values; arguably, medical researchers in 1930s Germany discovered the relationship between smoking and lung cancer because of, rather than despite, their Nazi political commitments (Proctor, 1999). Hence, my third question: how are debates over the proper relationship between political institutions and scientific research related to debates over the proper role of “non-epistemic” values in science? 

Of course, it is impossible to answer all three of these questions in a single paper. Rather, my aim is to motivate and sketch a distinctive way of thinking about them, in terms of the ethics of communication. In arguing for this communicative turn, I build on an emerging body-of-work in philosophy of science which treats the concept of communication as central to understanding the proper role of non-epistemic values in science (Wilholt, 2013; John, 2015; John, 2018; Franco, 2017). My argument comes in two parts. First, in sections 1-3 I outline the concept of wishful speaking with reference to the Lysenko affair, and, in section 4, show how this concept may clarify my three questions. Second, in sections 5-6 I sketch the more general claim that epistemic norms should be understood as guides to proper communication, with deeper implications for how we should understand the relationship between assertion, acceptance and audiences.

1. The Lysenko affair: a philosophical summary

My focus in this section is on clarifying the aspect of the Lysenko affair which, I claim, is most interesting for understanding the relationships between science and politics, the doctrine of partiinost’. Lysenko’s speech to the 1948 conference was the culmination of a longer intellectual and institutional story.​[1]​ Intellectually, Lysenko moved from claiming to have invented a new agricultural technique, vernalization, which could make winter seedlings behave like spring seedlings, to espousing a Lamarckian account of inheritance, focused on the cell rather than the gene. This “Michurinism” was firmly against the scientific consensus (both internationally and among Soviet scientists), in a way in which his earlier claims – although controversial – were not. As Lysenko’s theories changed, so, too, did his political power, as he moved from Azerbaijan to the Presidentship of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences. This was the result of several factors, including the positive response to his early research, his own political nous, how his persona fitted into Soviet models of peasant-scientists, and the promise that his research might increase agricultural yield. As a result, from the mid-1930s, Lysenko’s work, which combined agronomy, genetics and evolutionary theory, was claimed to exemplify the Marxist “practice-criterion” of truth. 

Debates between Mendelians and Michurinites criss-crossed scientific and political concerns in multiple ways, making the case central to Cold War polemics (see, for example, Huxley, 1949). They are still, as we see in Section 2, a touchstone in contemporary work on science and politics. Both before and during the decisive 1948 Conference, Lysenko’s claims were often couched in vitriolic, politically-charged language, memorably describing Mendelians as “fly-lovers and people-haters”, whereas he stressed the practical utility of his own research programme. He also appealed to broadly ideological arguments – for example, that the concept of the “gene” was “bourgeois idealism” – and attacked “bourgeois” researchers on the grounds that their work was implicated in Nazi eugenics. Furthermore, Lysenko himself was involved in the State-led persecution of other scientists – most notably Nikolai Vavilov – and, particularly subsequent to the conference, dissenters were sacked from their positions, and sometimes punished for their views. 

For this paper, I place these concerns to one side. While Lysenko’s arguments were rhetorically powerful, theoretical debates over the nature of inheritance were related to pressing practical questions about agricultural reform; hyperbole was to be expected. Furthermore, feminist philosophers of science have shown that background doctrines can shape biological theories, and that ascriptions of trustworthiness may legitimately be tied to social and political status (Lloyd, 2009; Grasswick, 2010). In claiming that his opponents’ views were distorted by ideology, and urging distrust on the basis of political entanglements, Lysenko was not necessarily appealing to epistemically irrelevant considerations. Indeed, following Levins and Lewontin (1995), one might think that Mendelians of the 1940s would have benefitted from some more reflection on these issues. Finally, while sending scientists to gulags was wrong, so, too, was sending poets and priests. This horrifying aspect of the affair does not tell us much about the link between politics and science specifically.  

My focus, then, is on the doctrine of partiinost’, that scientific work should be subordinated to the Party’s interests. We can distinguish two versions of that doctrine. First, weak partiiniost’, that choice of scientific research projects should be guided by the aim of solving problems which the Party deems important. Second, strong partiinost’, scientists’ own epistemic commitments should be guided by the Party’s assessments of what commitments they should hold.​[2]​ 

Philip Kitcher (2001, Chap.10) has proposed that a “well-ordered science” does not merely generate truths, but “significant” truths, where “significance” is a socially-relative concept. We can understand weak partiinost’ as one way of understanding this demand, relativized to what the Party, rather than Kitcher’s hypothetical congress of informed citizens, deems significant. Viewed this way, we might worry about how the Party decided on “significance”, and that invocations of the primacy of practice led to a blindness about the potential practical value of basic research. However, Kitcher’s general idea that scientific research should be guided by social needs and interests seems plausible. As such, weak partiinost’ seems closer to a bad way of instantiating a plausible idea than inherently problematic.  

By contrast, strong partiinost’ does seem clearly problematic: scientists’ epistemic commitments should not be subordinated to whatever the Party deems correct. In Stalin’s USSR, this demand was institutionalised in a particularly brutal way, but a scientist who chooses her epistemic commitments based solely on political considerations seems to be acting against basic scientific norms, even if her choices are uncoerced. Furthermore, concerns about such subordination seem separable from the value of the relevant political ends the Party sought to promote. What, though, does make strong partiinost’ so problematic?

2. Partiinost’: wishful speaking or wishful thinking?  

In discussions of the proper role of non-epistemic values in science, it is a fixed point that various epistemic vices should not be condoned. For example, both Heather Douglas and Helen Longino propose that scientific research must be “value-laden”, both suggest that resistance to such claims is often motivated by concerns about “wishful thinking”, and stress that their respective theories do not justify this vice (Longino 2004, 128; Douglas, 2007, 23-24). Therefore, one obvious candidate account for why partiinost’ is problematic is that it involves some form of wishful thinking. Indeed, Douglas herself suggests that she does not condone what (allegedly) happened in Soviet genetics on these grounds (Douglas, 2009, 79). This section argues against this line-of-thought: we should not understand the wrongness of partiinost’ in terms of a kind of wishful thinking, but in terms of a related, but distinct vice: wishful speaking. The first part defines my key terms more clearly before turning to show their relevance to the Lysenko affair.     

Despite its ubiquity, the concept of wishful thinking is hard to pin-down. The arguments below imply one reason why – it is easily confused with wishful speaking. However, paradigm charges of wishful thinking – such as the atheist’s charge that religious belief in an afterlife is wishful thinking – involve an accusation that some belief is held because the believer values the consequences of having that belief – say, the psychological comfort of future reunion with dead relatives – rather than because it is well-supported by the evidence (where “because” may refer to sub- or un- conscious motivation). What counts as “well-supported” by the evidence is contestable. However, I take it that in scientific contexts, the relevant concern is when scientists believe claims which are not well-established by the epistemic standards of their scientific community, i.e. rules or principles which specify the type and degree of evidence which must stand in favour of some claim before that claim can reasonably be used as a premise in practical or theoretical reasoning (John, 2015). Applying the concept of wishful thinking to scientific contexts may seem tricky because scientists sometimes “accept” claims – i.e. use them as premises in theoretical or practical reasoning – even when they do not believe them (Elliot and McKaughan, 2014). Plausibly, such attitudes can properly be guided by (broadly) non-epistemic concerns. For example, in some circumstances, we might act as if some chemical is carcinogenic, even if we lack compelling evidence to believe it is, because the costs of a false negative are so high. Still, even acceptance is governed by some epistemic standards: for example, it is impermissible to accept claims which are incompatible with the evidence, or one should not accept some claim if one has stronger evidence for a contrary claim. As such, even acceptance based on non-epistemic values may contravene epistemic standards. 

We can, then, define “wishful thinking”: 
a scientist engages in wishful thinking when she believes or accepts claims which, given her evidence, are not well-established relative to proper epistemic standards, and this acceptance is motivated by the non-epistemic benefits of accepting those claims, regardless of their truth.​[3]​ 
Not everyone uses the terminology of wishful thinking. Following Elizabeth Anderson (2004), Matthew Brown suggests that admonitions against value-driven research are attempts to capture a concern that scientists should not be “dogmatic” (2013). However, dogmatism is best understood as a form of wishful thinking as defined above, where one continues to hold beliefs against the evidence, because of the (perceived) non-epistemic benefits of doing so. I discuss the common view that wishful thinking is a vice in §6. Now, however, I will outline a related, but different, phenomenon: wishful speaking.  
  
As well as accepting or believing claims, scientists also assert them, at meetings, in journals, in television interviews, and so on. Although characterising scientific assertion is complex, it is a necessary condition on the propriety of some assertion by a scientist that she reasonably believes that her evidence for that claim meets the epistemic standards of her scientific community. Scientists might make claims which do not meet relevant standards due to laziness, ineptitude or the sheer difficulty of inference. However, one important deviation from this norm is when scientists engage in “wishful speaking”:
A scientist engages in wishful speaking when she makes a claim which is not well-established, and where her motivation for making that claim is the non-epistemic benefits that follow from others believing (or believing that she believes) that claim, regardless of its truth.

To illustrate, imagine that there is some controversy over whether a vaccine sometimes has serious side effects. An epidemiologist knows that, even if a vaccine will have side effects for some patients, mass vaccination will have an overall net benefit for the population. However, she also knows that individuals will only vaccinate if they think there are no side effects. Although the evidence is not sufficient, relative to norms of epidemiological inference, to justify accepting “this vaccine has no side effects”, she asserts this claim as a way of maintaining herd immunity. In the language of speech act theory, wishful speaking involves using “perlocutionary knowledge” – knowledge of the non-epistemic effects of some speech act – as a ground for asserting a claim which is not proper given illocutionary norms.​[4]​ 

The concept of wishful speaking requires further elaboration to capture various cases: for example, where scientists fail to report claims, and where claims are made by groups, rather than individuals. Most interesting are cases where scientists exploit ambiguities in evidence or standards to ensure that certain claims count as “well-established” because they want others to believe those claims. I address these complexities in detail elsewhere (John, in press). However, they are largely irrelevant to the main arguments of this section (and I return to the porosity of the research/communication boundary in the second half of this paper).  For now, all I want to note is that, although easily confused, wishful speaking and wishful thinking are distinct. As moralists lament, we can – and often do – assert claims we do not believe: we can engage in wishful speaking without wishful thinking. Furthermore, we can engage in “wishful thinking” without “wishful speaking”: I am not compelled to assert what I accept. Even when wishful thoughts are articulated, this may not count as wishful speaking, because the awareness that one’s claims are ill-established and the relevant motivation to secure non-epistemic ends may be missing. For example, even if a religious believer is a wishful thinker, in articulating her beliefs she is not necessarily a wishful speaker. 

Consider again strong partiinost’, which requires a subordination of epistemic commitments to political ends. The concept of “epistemic commitments” is ambiguous, between what we believe (or accept) and what we assert. Did the Lysenko affair involve a subversion of scientists’ private epistemic commitments – what they accepted – or their public epistemic commitments – what they asserted? Plausibly, the demand was that scientists both accepted and asserted the truth of Lysenkoism. However, the second demand was far more effective than the first. Consider the words of Alikhanian, a prominent biologist, at the 1948 conference: “I, as a communist, cannot and must not… obstinately oppose my personal views and concepts to the onward march of biological science… From tomorrow on, I shall not only myself try to emancipate myself from the old reactionary Weismann-Morganist [i.e. Mendelian] views, I shall also try to reform and convince all my pupils and comrades” (Pollock, 2006, 69). Did Alikhanian and others succeed in this task of emancipation? The evidence is mixed. As Krementsov (1992, Chap 7) shows, many researchers became expert at “playing the game” of espousing Lysenkoism in the classroom while developing research projects which avoided taking a stance on inheritance and privately rejecting Lysenkoist doctrine. Strikingly, when Watson and Crick’s seminal paper on the structure of DNA was translated into an obscure journal, the print run rapidly sold out (Young, 1978). 

Even if few officials and scientists believed Lysenkoism, they certainly asserted it. There are two senses in which partiinost’ involved wishful speaking. First, although the Central Committee approved Lysenko’s work for a variety of reasons, a large part of the appeal rested on the perceived consequences of audiences believing that Lysenko, and hence the Soviet model of science, had been vindicated. Second, invoking the authority of the Party meant that scientists had strong non-epistemic reasons to assert Lysenkoist doctrine. The only way in which to secure non-epistemic, prudential benefits – keeping a job, avoiding the Gulag – was by ensuring that others believed that they believed those claims. The Party’s decision to support Lysenko was at least partly based on views about the non-epistemic consequences of scientists asserting his ill-established claims, and this decision in turn, gave scientists non-epistemic reasons to assert those claims.   

We can best understand strong partiinost’ in terms of wishful speaking, rather than wishful thinking. Any reconstruction of dead historical actors’ beliefs and intentions is, of course, contestable. Assume, however, that my analysis is correct. Does that make the Lysenko affair any less problematic as an instance of political influence on science? I assume not: we care not only about what scientists believe but, also, about what they say. Why, though, is wishful speaking problematic?

3. Truth and consequences

In this section, I outline three answers to this question: in terms of wishful speaking’s epistemic consequences, in terms of its non-epistemic consequences, and in terms of disrespect. I argue that, while many instances of wishful speaking are wrong for more than one of these reasons, the third concern has conceptual priority, because all cases of wishful speaking are disrespectful, whereas not all cases lead to negative (epistemic and/or non-epistemic) consequences. This analysis implies that even if wishful speaking can sometimes be justified all-things-considered, it is always pro tanto wrongful.        

One obvious reason wishful speaking is often wrongful is that it leads hearers come to accept claims which they ought not in an epistemic sense accept; for example, that crop yields can be greatly increased through using certain techniques. A second obvious reason why wishful speaking is often wrongful is that it can have negative non-epistemic consequences; for example, some blame the failures of Soviet agriculture on adoption of Lysenkoist techniques (Lerner, 2001). Clearly, these sorts of consequences are often excellent reasons to condemn wishful speaking. However, we cannot understand the wrongfulness of wishful speaking entirely in consequentialist terms.  First, it is entirely possible that one might speak wishfully but still say something true. Indeed, recent developments in epigenetics complicate assessments of the relative epistemic merits of Mendelian and neo-Lamarckian doctrines (Barnes and Dupré, 2009, Chap.3). Second, wishful speaking may seem problematic even when following prevailing epistemic standards would not promote positive epistemic consequences. For example, one might think that contemporary “evidence hierarchies” in biomedicine are problematic, but be ethically outraged by how corporate actors flout these standards for their own ends (John, in press). Third, wishful speaking may have positive non-epistemic consequences. Consider, again, the epidemiologist and the vaccine: making an ill-established claim might cause “population-level” health benefits which are better than those which result from speaking honestly. The thought that telling the truth always or often has the best consequences is itself wishful thinking.  However, there is a strong sense that wishful speaking remains at least pro tanto wrongful, even when its (epistemic and/or non-epistemic consequences) are positive.





In this section, I consolidate and generalise my arguments by sketching some interim responses to the three challenges set out in the Introduction: what is the proper relationship between political institutions and scientific research? What is the proper role, if any, of non-epistemic values in scientific justification? What is the relationship between our answers to these questions? 

The arguments above suggest one starting-point for answering the first question: political institutions should not incentivise or promote wishful speaking. This may seem thin gruel, because wishful speaking may seem pertinent only to understanding mid Twentieth Century one-Party regimes. That would be a mistake, and not just because one-Party regimes remain more common than the contemporary literature on science and democracy implies. Consider a more contemporary example: climate sceptics sometimes claim that mainstream climate scientists’ epistemic commitments are guided by a political end of regulating private industry (Delingpole, 2012). If true, such charges would raise legitimate concerns about a malign influence of political commitments on scientists’ epistemic commitments. Even if we treat value commitments in cognitivist terms, rather than as expressions of taste (Anderson 2004), interpreting such accusations in terms of scientists’ beliefs is peculiar; how could a normative commitment to strong regulation lead anyone to believe that “climate change is anthropogenic”? Interpreted, however, as a claim that climate scientists’ assertions are governed by achieving their political end, regardless of their evidence, such accusations make sense. Conversely, consider claims that “climate sceptics” are motivated by (broadly) financial or ideological concerns (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). Again, such claims are best interpreted as implying that sceptics’ assertions are guided by a wish to achieve non-epistemic ends, such as lax emission standards, rather than as a claim about their beliefs. Indeed, one reason many of us find climate sceptics’ claims infuriating is because we suspect they do not believe what they say. Concerns about wishful speaking are not, then, mere historical curiosities. Nor should we assume that this phenomenon is particularly prominent in non-democratic political regimes. Rather, features of democratic orders, such as strong protections for press freedom, may create opportunities for wishful speaking, in ways which other social orders do not. 

With regard to the second question, my arguments so far do not show that non-epistemic values can or cannot play a proper role in justification. I return to these issues in the next two sections. However, they suggest a useful methodological tool for rethinking some debates around these questions: as concerned with what scientists should say, rather than what they should believe. Consider some examples. Gregor Betz (2013) argues that the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change exemplifies how even “policy-relevant” science can be “value-free”, because its protocols simply requires scientists to assign epistemic probabilities to hypotheses. Katie Steele (2012), by contrast, argues that the IPCC’s work exemplifies how the scientist qua policy advisors must make value judgments, because she must always make judgments about the proper degree-of-uncertainty to report. Do Betz and Steele disagree? Not necessarily. Rather, they are discussing different topics: Betz’s focus is whether ethical concerns must play a role in assigning probabilities to hypotheses; Steele’s is whether ethical concerns must play a role in deciding what to say. Once we disambiguate acceptance and assertion, both Betz and Steele might be right. 

Consider a second example, also from climate science: Wendy Parker (2014) argues against the claim that climate modelling must always incorporate non-epistemic value concerns. However, she concedes that the uncertainty inherent in modelling means that many of the predictions of climate models may be misleadingly precise, such that scientists “offer” predictions which they cannot really “own”. Although not how Parker frames her work, her focus on what scientists can offer to policy-makers implies that the central question about the relationship between non-epistemic values and climate modelling concerns communication rather than justification: what are scientists’ communicative obligations in cases where their predictions are subject to “second-order uncertainty”? 

The methodological recommendation to rethink debates over justification in terms of communication relates to my third question: the relationship between practical questions about the proper role of political institutions in scientific research and theoretical questions about the nature of justification. Consider David Ludwig’s argument that scientific justification cannot be “value-free” (Ludwig, 2016). Many scientific claims involve implicit reference to some ontology; i.e. a way of classifying the social and natural world. Scientists’ choice of ontology may significantly affect what they establish; for example, using different “species ontologies” may lead to different counts of the number of species in a wetlands area. Ludwig argues that “ontological choices” are sometimes underdetermined on purely epistemological grounds; there may be multiple, equally scientifically respectable ways of classifying the natural or social world. However, these choices may have significant non-epistemic effects. For example, using a scientifically respectable “racial ontology” may perpetuate racial injustice. As such, he argues, we have good political reasons not to use some scientifically respectable ontologies.  Therefore, Ludwig concludes, whether some claim employing an ontology is justified turns, in part, on the moral and political consequences of its use. 

The approach above provides a way of addressing Ludwig’s important concerns, while remaining agnostic on his striking conclusion. An ethics of science communication is an account of when scientific assertions are proper. There are very many dimensions along which some scientific assertion might be better or worse: for example, to the extent that it answers social needs, or makes a novel contribution to knowledge. Regardless of how we balance such virtues, an assertion must meet certain conditions if it is to be permissible at all. My concept of wishful speaking is parasitic on one such condition: the claim asserted must be well-established relative to relevant local epistemic standards.​[7]​ However, that it would be wrongful to assert a claim which is not well-established does not imply that it is always permissible to assert claims which are well-established. For example, just because I know some claim about how to build a cheap bomb is well-established, it does not follow that it is permissible to assert it, because doing so might lead to great harm. Although the concept of wishful speaking restricts the proper role of perlocutionary knowledge in scientific speech contexts, it does not imply that scientific speech is permissible regardless of its perlocutionary consequences.

Returning to Ludwig, we can distinguish the question of whether some claim would be justified relative to relevant epistemic standards and whether it would be ethically permissible to assert. If Ludwig is correct that racial ontologies may be scientifically respectable, then claims which employ racial categories may be justifiable in the first sense. However, if we have negative obligations not to perpetuate racial injustice, making such claims may be ethically impermissible in the second. An ethically aware scientist should not do research using racial categories; there is no point establishing a result you should not assert. If scientists cannot be trusted in the difficult tasks of accurately identifying and meeting their communicative obligations, there may be excellent reasons for political institutions to dis-incentivise or ban certain sorts of research. As such, our actual practices of justification – and, hence, which claims we end up justifying – should be sensitive to (broadly) political concerns, reflected in institutional and regulatory arrangements. However, it does not follow from the fact that it would be ethically wrong to assert some claim that the claim is therefore unjustified. Imagine a physician treating a patient with late-stage cancer. The physician may decide not to run a test for heart disease, because she knows that she would have reasons of compassion not to report a positive result. This does not imply that had she done the test, her result would thereby be unjustified. Thinking through the ethics of communication allows us to recognise the limits of what Hugh Lacey (1999) calls scientific “autonomy” - the idea that scientific research should be largely unhindered by social and political institutions - while bracketing-off questions about “impartiality”, i.e. the proper role of non-epistemic values in justification. 

In this section, I have outlined some implications of taking the concept of wishful speaking – and the more general task of constructing an ethics of science communication – seriously. As such, I have generalised Sandra Mitchell’s thought that we need to distinguish between the role of values in justifying beliefs and in justifying actions, including assertion (Mitchell, 2004). Still, these arguments are limited. They imply, for example, that we can respect Ludwig’s political concerns without necessarily buying his theoretical claim about justification, but they do not show whether scientists must, can or should appeal to non-epistemic values to solve problems of underdetermination. 

Consider, in this context, the correspondence between Lysenko and Stalin (Pollock, 2006, 56). The former wrote to the latter that because “all science is class-oriented by nature” scientific doctrines should not be assessed solely in terms of their epistemic support, but also in terms of how they promote the proletariat’s interests. Stalin himself disagreed, adding in the margins of Lysenko’s letter, “ha! ha! ha! And what about Mathematics? What about Darwinism?”  In this exchange, it seems that Lysenko and Stalin disagreed over whether scientific justification is, can, or should be “value-free”, rather than the proper uses of perlocutionary knowledge.  It may seem that any answer to this question must start from the ethics of belief, rather than assertion. 

The rest of this paper challenges this priority of the cognitive over the communicative. To put the issue as simply as possible, having stressed that, once we have epistemic standards in place, we should distinguish questions about justification and acceptance from questions about permissible assertion, I will now suggest that epistemic standards themselves should be assessed in terms of proper communication, rather than proper belief. This argument has two steps. In the next section I show that the ethics of communication has implications for debates over the proper role of non-epistemic values in justificatory contexts. Specifically, it supports a “Value Apt Ideal” in justification. In the final section, I return to the concept of wishful thinking to motivate a more general account of the centrality of the ethics of communication to epistemic practice.  

5.  The Value Apt Ideal

Debates over the proper role of non-epistemic values in science have a complex structure. The Value Free Ideal (VFI) states that “the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. political or moral) grounds” (Betz, 2013, 207). We can ask two questions of this ideal. First, is it viable? “Ought implies can”; therefore, if scientific justification must (in a logical sense) be based on non-epistemic values, the VFI must be rejected. Second, is it attractive? If we can insulate justification from non-epistemic values, is it somehow valuable to do so? In this section, I argue for a successor to the VFI, which I call the Value Apt Ideal. As I explain below, this ideal captures some of the reasons why the VFI might seem attractive, while largely side-stepping the question of whether the VFI is viable.

To better appreciate these distinctions between viability and attractiveness, and to motivate my positive arguments, consider some examples. In an early paper, Heather Douglas (2000) argues that even if Hempel is correct that it is possible to respond to inductive risk problems by appeal solely to epistemic values, doing so can be ethically problematic. Conversely, some defences of the VFI start from the claim that it expresses a politically appealing ideal. For example, Betz states that the VFI “derives straightforwardly… from the ideal of personal autonomy”, because “personal autonomy would be jeopardized if the scientific findings we rely on in everyday life were soaked with moral assumptions” (Betz, 2013, 207). For Betz, then, the VFI is clearly attractive – the harder question is whether it is viable.

In Section 3, I argued that respect for autonomy is a fundamental value in scientific communication. Those claims suggest one way in which to flesh out Betz’s brisk argument for the appeal of the VFI. In asserting claims, scientists imply that their audience has reasons to hold those claims. However, if scientists’ claims are “based” on non-epistemic values, then audiences who do not share those values may lack good reasons to accept them. Implying that someone should accept a claim based on non-epistemic values which she does not hold is to disrespect her as an autonomous agent. Therefore, communicating claims whose justification rests on non-epistemic value judgments conflicts with the demand that we respect others’ autonomy. Unfortunately, however, (this reconstruction of) Betz’s argument is misguided: respect for autonomy does not necessarily support the VFI. This is because respect for autonomy does not demand that speakers always recuse themselves from making non-epistemic value-judgments in communicative contexts. Rather, it places limits on which values they should use; specifically, they should use values shared by their audience.  

To motivate this general claim, consider cases where we must choose which well-established claims to report; for example, it might be impossible for a physician to communicate every possible side effect of some treatment to her patient. Indeed, doing so might lead the patient to giving confused, rather than informed, consent (Manson and O’Neill, 2007). How should the physician decide which risks to report? Respect for autonomy implies that her communicative choices should be informed by (well-grounded knowledge of) her audience’s values. Imagine the physician knows that there is a small chance an operation will require a blood transfusion; plausibly, she should communicate this risk to patients who have a religious objection to transfusion, but not to atheists for whom this fact has no relevance. In turn, these communicative obligations are independent of the physician’s own substantive commitments. Respect for autonomy does not mean we should be blind to value judgments. Rather, it requires that when deciding what to assert, we should aim to ensure that our assertions are value-apt: they must be relevant to our audience’s non-epistemic values. Note that there are problems with meeting this ethical demand in cases where the audience contains individuals with different, contradictory values, or whose values are unknown; I return to these complexities below. Still, I take it that, at least in simple cases – such as that of the physician – respectful communication requires value-aptness, rather than value-freedom. 

Assume, for the sake of argument, that the VFI is not viable; i.e. at least sometimes, decisions as to whether claims are well-established (i.e. justified) are properly based on non-epistemic values. For example, imagine that certain choices are epistemically underdetermined, such that the only way to decide whether to treat some claim as established requires making a non-epistemic value judgment (Douglas, 2000). Call claims based on such judgments “value-based” claims. Following the argument above, respect for autonomy does not imply that it is always impermissible to assert value-based claims to an audience. Rather, much as our choice of what to assert should be value-apt, so, too, judgments of which value-based claims to assert should also be guided by our audience’s values. If an audience does not hold the values assumed in justification, asserting the relevant claims is improper; if the audience does hold those values, asserting the relevant claims can be proper.​[8]​ 

As a simplified example, assume that standards for assessing drug toxicity assume non-epistemic values, such as the proper trade-off between the harms associated with over-regulation and under-regulation (Douglas, 2000). Betz (2013) claims that it might be possible to present research in ways which avoids making such judgments. My claim is that, even if such communicative strategies are viable, respect for autonomy does not imply that they are obligatory. It may be entirely proper to assert “value-based claims” to a policy-maker who endorses the relevant trade-off, but impermissible to communicate the very same claim to a policy-maker who does not.​[9]​ In the latter case, asserting the result disrespects the policy-maker’s autonomy by implying that she should accept a claim which she has good value-based reasons to reject. In the former case, asserting the result is not only compatible with respecting autonomy, but may improve the audience’s ability to choose in accordance with her own values. 

To summarise, I propose that respect for autonomy implies that we should hold the “Value-Apt Ideal” (VAI) for science: 
When we are justifying scientific findings to be communicated to some audience, the justification of those findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. political or moral) values which are incompatible with the values of the putative audience. 
I have argued that the VAI is an attractive ideal: what follows? First, assume that the VFI is viable; i.e. scientists can justify claims without appeal to non-epistemic values. If so, it is trivially true that a justificatory process which is not based on any non-epistemic values meets the VAI. Therefore, if the VFI is viable and we intend to communicate our results – and few people do research they do not intend to communicate – we have good reasons, grounded in respect for autonomy, to meet its demands. Given this context, value-free justification – if viable – is a safe way of respecting autonomy. Note, however, that this endorsement of value free justification is limited. In principle, even if the VFI is viable, we can breach that principle and still respect autonomy, as long as scientists can reasonably assume that their audience holds the relevant values. Second, assume, for the sake of argument, that the VFI is not viable; that is to say, non-epistemic values must (in a logical sense) play a role in scientific justification. If so, the VAI could still be used to assess scientific justificatory practices, because it places important limits on the (non-epistemic) values to which scientists may appeal: they must be values the putative audience holds. 

In short, the VAI is an appealing ideal, which can, in practice, provide guidance regardless of whether or not the VFI is viable. Still, one might worry that if the VFI is not viable, then, in practice, neither is the VAI. To explain: scientific claims are rarely – if ever – made to a single individual whose values we know in advance, but, rather, are “heard” by multiple individuals, possibly with conflicting (or unknown) values. This is clearly true when a scientist publishes in a journal. However, the problem may also affect more circumscribed cases, such as “regulatory” or “policy-oriented” science, where a claim made for the benefit of one set of users with stable, identifiable values, may foreseeably be taken-up and used by other agents, with different values.​[10]​ It may seem that in such cases we simply cannot ensure that any non-epistemic values used in justification are apt. In response to these problems, I suggest that we need to adopt a complex account of value-aptness, focussed on practices, rather than instances of justification. To explain, note that, in general, if our epistemic standards are to enable effective communication, they must be relatively “static”; if scientists were constantly to alter their standard testing procedures, it would be extremely hard for other scientists (and broader audiences) to assess the trustworthiness of their testimony (Wilholt, 2013). Therefore, if justificatory practices are (necessarily) value-based, we need to consider the aptness of those values in general, rather than in specific cases. Imagine for example, that epistemic standards which favour the avoidance of “false positives” lead us to make some claim which does not reflect the values of some of our audience (who would, for non-epistemic reasons, prefer avoidance of false negatives). Imagine, however, that we can show that even these audience members have good reasons to want it to be a general rule that scientific inference is guided by a preference to avoid false positives, say, because this is in their long-term prudential interests (John, 2015). I propose that, in such cases, even if the specific instance of justification is apparently not “value-apt”, such claims are still proper according to the VAI, because the practices are “value-apt”. 

Of course, it is an open question whether we can identify sets of values whose use is, in general, justifiable (even if controversial in some instances). Nonetheless, even before identifying such values, the VAI can play an important role in criticising various actual justificatory practices (and, hence, retain its attractiveness). The ideal can, for example, rule out justificatory practices which, even if only implicitly, assume an androcentric world view, such as certain norms of biomedical testing (Bueter, 2015). We can be certain that such practices rest on non-epistemic value assumptions which are not shared by (at least some, and, one hopes, most, of) their putative audience, even if we cannot be certain which values (if any) would be shared by all audience members. Meeting communicative obligations would require changes to biomedical testing procedures in ways which avoid this problem. Similarly, many concerns over “inappropriate” influences of non-epistemic values in scientific contexts can be re-interpreted in terms of a concern about the mismatch between the values assumed in justification and the values held by putative audiences. For example, concerns about the ways in which some biomedical testing procedures minimise “producer risk” at the cost of increasing “consumer risk” may best be understood as concerns that it is the values of the audience of claims, not those who make claims, which should guide justification (John, in press).   

I do not wish to minimise the difficulties inherent in ensuring that scientific practice meets the Value Apt Ideal. In favour of my proposal, however, note two further considerations. First, this approach provides a useful way of understanding the enduring appeal of the Value Free Ideal, despite concerns about its viability: precisely because the challenges of ensuring that any values used in justificatory contexts are “apt”, we have good reason to want to excise values from those contexts, even if this is not possible. Second, anyone who doubts the viability of the VFI, faces a challenge: which non-epistemic values should play a role in scientific justification? Broadly, we can identify three answers to that challenge: those the speaker happens to hold; those that are objectively correct; those held by the audience. Once we recognise that scientific findings are typically communicated to audiences, the first option is deeply problematic: one is forcing one’s own values on others. The second option may seem more appealing, but faces the same epistemic challenges as the third: just as it is difficult to know the values of one’s audience, so, too, it is difficult to know which values are objectively correct. 

Of course, there are sophisticated answers to these challenges, some of which might relate to a more sophisticated version of “value-aptness”. For example, one might hold that an audience’s values should be equated with those values they would hold after informed deliberation. This suggests an approach similar to Longino’s account of the correct “contextual values” as those which are settled by a form of communal deliberation (Longino, 2002). My aim is not to settle these issues, but to point out that, once we allow that non-epistemic values might play an essential role in justification, we need some way of settling which values should be used; the ethics of communication helps us understand how to achieve that task.  

I have argued from an account of the ethics of communication to a Value Apt Ideal, which is, I have suggested, both viable and appealing. I stress again that when I say that this ideal is viable, I do not mean that it is easy or straightforward to implement. As the Lysenko affair teaches us, social and political arrangements play a major role in shaping scientific research, such that attaining value aptness may be extremely hard. The ideal is viable in the sense that it is theoretically consistent, and can reasonably be used as a measure for assessing actual practice. However, even this modest claim may be too strong because I may not yet have answered the challenge at the end of the previous section. One reason to be concerned about the possible influence of non-epistemic values on scientific justification is that non-epistemic values are not truth-tropic. That is to say, appeal to such values does not necessarily lead us closer to the goal of forming true beliefs or gaining knowledge. Such concerns seem central to understanding debates over the proper role of non-epistemic values in justification (Steel, 2013). Moreover, there is no obvious reason to think that uncontroversial ethical values are epistemically preferable to controversial values. Therefore, using the VAI to rethink debates over non-epistemic values in science may seem to address the wrong issue: we need to think about proper cognition, not proper communication! Why, then, adopt a communication-centric perspective on debates over justification?

6. Rethinking wishful thinking

One reason for conceptualising epistemic standards and practices as primarily governing what scientists assert, rather than what they accept or believe, is that this relates to a rich strand in recent history and sociology of science, which has interpreted scientific practice in terms of the need to build and maintain trust across groups of researchers. For example, Timmermans and Berg (2010) argue that the practices of modern epidemiology can best be understood in terms of a breakdown of epistemic trust in the pronouncements of “expert” medics. Similarly, Ted Porter (1996) has explained the rise of statistical techniques in psychology and the social sciences – and a displacement of other forms of evidence, such as psychological “introspection” – in terms of the difficulties of establishing trust across geographically dispersed research communities. Epistemic practices which emerged as the result of communicative pressures can be solidified into rules for determining when claims are established. Even if the use of introspection was undermined as a tool in psychology because such evidence was unconvincing to others, rather than because it was not truth-tropic, a contemporary psychologist on a desert island would still abjure introspection as evidence. Of course, these practices did not evolve because of a concern for respecting audiences’ autonomy, but, nonetheless, my arguments above provide a normative standard for assessing justificatory practices which fits with our understandings of the relationship between communication and justification. Still, one might think that even if our actual justificatory practices are shaped by communicative pressures, ultimately they should be assessed in terms of how well they promote the end of proper belief, not the end of proper assertion. There is, however, a further reason for adopting my perspective, which brings us full-circle: the ethics of communication can explain why that paradigm fault in justificatory contexts, wishful thinking, is so problematic.

Consider one obvious account of why scientists should not engage in wishful thinking: it is a basic norm of epistemic rationality that we apportion our beliefs to our empirical evidence; non-epistemic political or ethical commitments are not a form of empirical evidence; therefore, in allowing these commitments to determine what we believe, we are violating a basic norm of epistemic rationality. Of course, we might think that it can be permissible to accept claims we lack reasons to believe, and that scientists more often accept than believe their results, complicating matters. However, even acceptance should be sensitive to the evidence. Clearly, such arguments capture one set of reasons why wishful thinking seems problematic, much as they provide a basis for explaining why some cases of wishful speaking can be problematic. However, I argued above that concerns about epistemic consequences cannot capture the entire story of why wishful speaking is wrongful, because there is a distinctly ethical element to such judgments. So, too, they cannot fully capture the sense that wishful thinking is particularly problematic in scientific contexts.

For individual human agents, even if wishful thinking is epistemically irrational, it can be, all-things-considered, rational. In believing some claim on the basis of my political commitments I may gain in terms of subjective well-being, and even my objective well-being. To insist otherwise is to assume a highly contestable view of the good life. Lysenko’s increasingly obstinate resistance to criticism might be viewed as a form of wishful thinking. However, it seems plausible that he did well as a result, or, at least, he was better-off than he would have had he been more open to criticism. Maybe wishful thinking is prudentially irrational in the long-run. Maybe. But people make imprudent choices all of the time. Often, we tolerate this fact, and there are certainly good arguments to think we should tolerate it. Why, then, do we feel so strongly that scientists’ cognitive commitments should not be formed via wishful thinking? There are multiple possible answers to this question. Perhaps the most popular is to say that truth, or a related good such as knowledge, is the – or at least an – ultimate goal of scientific reasoning, and, as such, scientists’ cognitive attitudes should not be subject to non-truth-tropic influences (Steel 2013).

However, there is an alternative explanation of why wishful thinking is so problematic: in terms of the ethics of communication. A claim which I believe or accept on the basis of my non-epistemic commitments may be fit for me to believe, in the sense that it promotes my all-things-considered well-being. However, this does not necessarily imply that it is fit for others to believe or accept the claim on the basis of their non-epistemic commitments; that my commitments, both epistemic and non-epistemic, cohere when I am committed to Lysenkoism does not imply that your commitments will also cohere if you accept that doctrine. Acting on my claims may result in you failing to achieve your practical ends because you abide by a faulty view of heredity, without the counterweight of a pleasing glow of ideological righteousness.​[11]​ Even if, as Miriam Solomon (2012) puts it, my beliefs and values are intertwined in a “web of valief”, such that individual justification will involve value judgments, it may be impermissible to assert all the claims which neatly fit into “my” web to others. Of course, scientists can engage in wishful thinking without then articulating their commitments, and this may still seem wrongful. However, it is easier to avoid articulating wishful thoughts if one never has them, and, as such, there are good reasons to want scientists to avoid such thought patterns entirely. 





I do not know how to establish the very general framework articulated above, other than by appeal to how it helps us think through other debates. Consider, then, the three questions raised at the start of this paper. First, what is the proper relationship between political institutions and scientific research? Clearly, I have not answered this question in its entirety. What I have shown is that any proper answer must be alert to the ethics of communication. On the one hand, political institutions should not encourage or incentivise wishful speaking, but, on the other, there are many cases where the potential consequences of scientific speech are such that it should be regulated. Second, what is the proper role, if any, of non-epistemic values in scientific justification? We should rethink these debates in terms of the “Value Apt Ideal”, which stems from a concern with the ethics of communication, thereby providing a fuller account of why wishful thinking is wrong. Finally, what is the relationship between our answers to these questions? The arguments above suggest an odd irony. 

Consider, again, Stalin’s bemusement at Lysenko’s claims. Stalin himself seemed to hold that we can separate questions of scientific justification from ideological disputes.​[12]​ Still, Stalin supported Lysenko’s 1948 intervention, which promulgated a theory which clearly did not meet prevailing epistemic standards. Plausibly, this reflected Stalin’s own high estimation of his abilities to understand and assess on-going scientific controversies, perhaps coloured in this case by his own prior commitment to neo-Lamarckian ideas.​[13]​ In Stalin’s own eyes, his intervention was not ideological, but a judicious exercise of epistemic judgment. At the same time, there is evidence that Stalin’s long-standing support for Lysenko was, at least partially, the result of doctored reports of the successes of vernalization on collective farms (Pollock, 2006, Chap.3). It seems plausible that this data was doctored because many were too scared to tell him the truth. Ironically, while Stalin himself may have held to a version of the “Value Free Ideal”, he helped create a system which incentivised and encouraged wishful speaking. 
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^1	  In summarising these debates I have drawn on Young, 1978; Krementsov, 1996; Roll-Hansen, 2004; Pollock, 2006; deJong Lambert, 2012. 
^2	  This is an anachronistic distinction, not recognised in the USSR. However, what I call “weak partiinost’” may be seen as a specification of the “practice-criterion of truth” which played an important role in Lysenko’s rise (Roll-Hansen, 2004). 
^3	  As an anonymous reviewer has helpfully pointed out, there is a distinction between two kinds of wishful thinking: first, believing (or accepting) “p” because one values the consequences of p being true; second, believing (or accepting) “p” because one values the consequences of believing/accepting that p. Clearly, in many cases, these two motivations overlap, insofar as we often value the consequences of believing that p because we value the consequences of p being true. (Perhaps the case of the belief in the afterlife is like that). Nonetheless, they may come apart: for example, a misanthrope might value the consequences of believing that people are inherently selfish – say, a sense of vindication – even though she would not actually want people to be inherently selfish. Arguably, our everyday sense of wishful thinking tracks the first, rather than the second, source of motivation, but my definition is centred on the second. In response, note that, first, this may be a distinction which rarely makes a difference (for the reasons suggested above). Second, more importantly, regardless of everyday use, the second sense may be more useful when we think about scientific contexts. In these contexts, our concerns with wishful thinking are, I suggest, more often that scientists believe or accept claims because of how those claims fit into the web of the rest of their cognitive and practical commitments, rather than with cases where they accept claims because they would prefer that the world be that way. For example, a physicist who continues to hold a highly implausible theory because it was her own creation seems guilty of wishful thinking, regardless of how she “wants” the universe to be (or, more precisely, if she “wants” the universe to be as her theory predicts, this is a function of her valuing the benefits of continuing to believe her theory without cognitive friction). Therefore, I suggest that, even if my proposed definition is at odds with everyday usage in some cases, it is still a more useful definition for thinking through the roles of values in science.     
^4	  The term “perlocutionary” comes from Austin (1975); for a discussion of how to model scientific assertion more generally on speech act theory see Franco (2017). 
^5	  This general account of the wrongness of lying descends from Kant (1797/2012). For a general discussion of Kant’s theory of deceit, see Carson, 2010, Chap.10, and, for this particular interpretation, see Korsgaard 1988. 
^6	  An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that there may be an interesting continuum here between diligent-but-honestly-mistaken speakers and wishful speakers, including, for example, speakers, who dis-respect audiences by making “honest” errors out of sheer carelessness. Mapping these ethical distinctions is beyond the scope of this paper, but suggests interesting further work on the ethics of communication. 
^7	  Note that, by “permissible”, I mean “ethically permissible”; as my discussion of climate denialism suggests, “legal permissibility” may differ.
^8	  See my (2018) for what counts as ethical communication if the audience falsely assumes that justification is “value-free”. 
^9	  Note that this case is, strictly, more complex again, because there might be cases where the policy-maker’s values are not the values which, in her role, she should endorse (say, they are values not shared by the broader community). Such cases raise tricky problems about the ethics of advising immoral or inept agents, and hence for the ethics of science communication, but they can, I suggest, only be resolved once we have a clear view of the simpler case where the audience’s values are unobjectionable. 
^10	  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for forcing me to confront this issue.
^11	  Indeed, the Lysenko affair serves as a reminder that establishing when factual commitments do fit with value commitments is no straightforward matter; that neo-Lamarckianism cohered better with Marxist thought was by no means obvious to many disputants.
^12	  For a further intriguing example, see Pollock’s discussion of Stalin’s involvement in debates in linguistics in the 1950s, where he held a decidedly “non-Marxist” line (Pollock, 2006).
^13	  See, for example, his 1906 pamphlet “Anarchism or Socialism”
^14	  Previous versions of this paper were delivered in Cambridge, Tilburg, Durham and Beijing. I am grateful to audiences for their constructive feedback, with especial thanks to Andrew Buskell, Alfred Moore, Torsten Wilholt and Xiaomin Zhu for particularly insightful comments. Thanks to Alexander Levine for some sensible advice on what to do with this paper. Thanks, too, to Anna Alexandrova, Gabriele Badano, Mary Brazelton, Charlotte Goodburn and Tim Lewens for comments on previous drafts (and apologies to Mary for remaining historical and historiographical inaccuracies). Finally, thank you to the two anonymous referees for this journal.   
